Florida Law Review
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 8

March 1959

Divorce: Alimony to an Adulterous Wife
Donald H. Reed Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Donald H. Reed Jr., Divorce: Alimony to an Adulterous Wife, 12 Fla. L. Rev. 107 (1959).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol12/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Reed: Divorce: Alimony to an Adulterous Wife
CASE COMMENTS
bation is itself a sufficient restraint on the defendant to require an
adjudication of guilt.
CONCLUSION

There is a dear usurpation of legislative authority by the judiciary when an adjudication of guilt in a criminal case is indefinitely
suspended. The determination of who is to lose his civil rights is
within the province of the legislature or is prescribed by constitutional
provisions. The statutes and the Constitution of Florida require that
those convicted of certain crimes forfeit their civil rights. Can the
courts, by simply omitting to adjudicate guilt, circumvent these mandates?
The statutes are clear. If the trial judge is to grant probation, the
accused must first be convicted of the crime of which he has been
found guilty. The only way that this can be done is by an adjudication of the accused's guilt, and when this adjudication is made the
defendant loses his civil rights. It may be that the purpose of a probationary system could be more fully realized if probationers were
allowed to retain their civil rights, but this is a question for the legislature to decide.
GRANVEL S. KIRKLAND

CASE COMMENTS
DIVORCE: ALIMONY TO AN ADULTEROUS WIFE
Benson v. Benson, 102 So.2d 748 (3d D.C.A. Fla.1958)
Plaintiff sued for divorce, charging his wife with cruelty, ungovernable temper, and adultery. The wife answered by denial and
counterclaimed for divorce, charging cruelty, intemperance, and
adultery. The evidence showed that the adulterous acts of the wife
occurred after her husband had left her. At the trial the chancellor
found the equities to be in favor of the defendant wife, granted her
the divorce, and awarded her permanent alimony and the husband's
interest in the home. On appeal, HELD, discretion reposes in the
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chancellor to award a divorce to the party with the greater equities;
but, in view of the statute providing that no alimony shall be granted
to an adulterous wife, alimony cannot be awarded. Decree affirmed
as to the grant of divorce and reversed as to the award of alimony and
the husband's interest in the home.
The ecclesiastical courts employed alimony as a means to enforce
the common law duty of the husband to support his wife.1 Modern
courts still recognize this common law obligation of the husband as
a basis for the wife's right to receive alimony, 2 but they look also to
the necessities of the wife and the husband's ability to pay.3 The
right of the chancellor to grant alimony is largely discretionary, and
it is one of the incidental powers with which the court is vested in its
4
jurisdiction over divorces.
Florida courts have used this discretionary power to award alimony
notwithstanding the fact that the wife has been guilty of misconduct.5
This is generally true in other jurisdictions. 6 However, a Florida
statute provides that no alimony may be granted to an adulterous
wife.1 For reasons of public policy, other jurisdictions, by statute or
by judicial decision, have come to the same conclusion. 8 However, a
recent California decision held that the adultery of the wife does not
compel the court to deny her alimony when both parties have been
at fault.9 The court recognized that the greater or lesser fault, in
iSee CARSON, THE LAW OF THE FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN FLORIDA 663
(1950).
2E.g., In the matter of Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958); Jacobs v.
Jacobs, 50 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1951); In re Fisher, 153 N.E.2d 832 (I1. 1959); Scalf v.
Scalf, 312 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1958).
3Brunner v. Brunner, 159 Fla. 762, 32 So.2d 736 (1947); Clark v. Clark, 155 Fla.
574, 20 So.2d 900 (1945); Platt v. Platt, 103 So.2d 253 (1st D.G.A. Fla. 1958).
4E.g., Carlton v. Carlton, 104 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1958); Stern v. Stern, 75 So.2d
812 (Fla. 1954); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 105 So.2d 379 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958); Lewis v.
Lewis, 104 So.2d 597 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
5E.g., Chestnut v. Chestnut, 160 Fla. 83, 33 So.2d 730 (1948); Brunner v. Brunner, supra note 3; Rowan v. Rowan, 147 Fla. 473, 2 So.2d 869 (1941); Baker v.
Baker, 94 Fla. 1001, 114 So. 661 (1927).
6E.g., Zook v. Zook, 233 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Spreckels v. Spreckels, 111
Cal. 2d 529, 244 P.2d 917 (1953); Moore v. Moore, 207 Ga. 335, 61 S.E.2d 500
(1951); Paliakoff v. Paliakoff, 221 S.C. 391, 70 S.E.2d 625 (1953).
7FLA. STAT. §65.08

(1957).

sSpaulding v. Spaulding, 133 Ind. 122, 32 N.E. 224 (1892); Hawkins v. Hawkins,
193 N.Y. 409, 86 N.E. 468 (1908); Anderson v. Anderson, 68 N.W.2d 849 (N.D.
1955).
9MuelIer v. Mueller, 276 P.2d 693 (2d D.C.A. Cal. 1954).
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